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INTRODUCTION 
The public trust doctrine is a paradox. The doctrine is of centuries-
old vintage,1 and its obligations have been described as among the 
most fundamental imposed on government.2 Commentators 
explaining the doctrine in modern terms have noted that it also 
responds to unassailable understandings of how democratic politics 
works in a liberal democracy.3 Moreover, the doctrine strikes a deeply 
resonant chord with Americans, given our national narrative about the 
common heritage of our nation’s natural beauty and abundance.4 Nor 
is interest in the doctrine an artifact of the nineteenth century, or even 
the early, heady days of the environmental movement a generation 
ago; in May 2011, the press accorded wide coverage5 to an ambitious 
 
 1 The doctrine is generally traced back to the laws of the Byzantine emperor 
Justinian. See, e.g., Charles Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some 
Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 429 
n.18 (1989) (citing Byzantine law recognizing “public values in water”). For a view 
that the doctrine is of considerably more recent, though still centuries-old, vintage, 
see Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 728 (1986). 
 2 See, e.g., Karl Coplan, Public Trust Limits on Greenhouse Gas Trading Schemes: A 
Sustainable Middle Ground?, 35 COLUM. J. ENVT’L L. 287, 288 (2009) (asserting 
limitations on government action based on public trust doctrine “are inherent in the 
nature of sovereignty”); Mary Christina Wood, You Can’t Negotiate With a Beetle: 
Environmental Law for a New Ecological Age, 50 NAT. RES. J. 167, 204 (2010) 
(describing Supreme Court’s reliance on public trust doctrine in Illinois Cent. R.R. v. 
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) as grounded in notions of inalienable sovereign power).  
 3 The classic statement of the democratic flaws sought to be corrected by the 
doctrine, and indeed, the classic defense of the doctrine more generally, is Joseph 
Sax’s 1970 article. See Joseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: 
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 495-496 (1970). To state, as this 
Article does, that the doctrine “responds” to the systematic under-representation of 
environmental interests in government decision-making is not necessarily to agree 
that that problem still exists. See, e.g., Richard Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of 
Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 
IOWA L. REV. 631, 658-91 (1986) [hereinafter Lazarus, Changing Conceptions] (arguing 
that changes in administrative law since Sax’s article have obviated the under-
representation concern); see also infra Part IV.C.2 (considering Lazarus’s critique).  
 4 See, e.g., Lazarus, Changing Conceptions, supra note 3, at 701 (noting doctrine’s 
“mystical and romantic appeal”); Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 433 n.37 (1989) 
(describing inspiration nineteenth century American writers and artists drew from 
wilderness); WOODY GUTHRIE, THIS LAND IS YOUR LAND, ON THIS LAND IS YOUR LAND: 
THE ASCH RECORDINGS, VOL. 1 (Smithsonian Folkways 1997) (describing “golden 
valleys” and “wheat fields waving”). 
 5 See Felicity Barringer, Suit Accuses U.S. Government of Failing to Protect Earth for 
Generations Unborn, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/05/ 
science/earth/05climate.html. 
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lawsuit filed by climate change activists relying on the public trust 
doctrine to request wide-ranging limits on climate-modifying 
activities.6 
And yet the doctrine raises troubling questions. Its legal source is 
murky and confined to a subset of resources which modern scholars 
deem as arbitrarily limited in scope.7 But when scholars argue in favor 
of broadening the doctrine’s limitation beyond its traditional focus on 
aquatic resources, critics can readily criticize them for embracing a 
judicial role for which courts have neither the legal authority nor the 
expertise,8 and for seeking a doctrinal expansion that neither legal 
precedent nor sound policy supports.9 
Ironically, the doctrine has also suffered from its success. In states 
where arguments have convinced legislators and state constitution 
drafters to include protections for public trust assets, the question has 
arisen whether the doctrine plays any independent role.10 Attempts to 
find such a role collide with arguments that positive law enactments 
either codified the public trust doctrine under common law, and thus 
superseded it, or that they reflect the same concerns as the doctrine, 
thus obviating any need for its independent existence. On the other 
hand, where state constitutions encompass the doctrine, they also 
arguably incorporate the doctrine’s evolution. Under this latter 
dynamic, the state constitutions have not so much superseded the 
public trust doctrine as incorporated it, evolution and all, thus 
justifying the doctrine’s continued operation under the authority of 
the positive law provision. These conflicting understandings illustrate 
 
 6 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 15-16, Alec L. v. Jackson, 
No. CV-112203 (N.D. Cal. filed May 4, 2011), 2011 WL 1675203, available at 
http://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/FEDERAL%20FILE%20STAMPED
%20COMPLAINT.pdf. This lawsuit furnished the template for lawsuits filed in state 
courts throughout the nation. See Lawsuits, OUR CHILDRENS’ TRUST, 
http://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/legal-action/lawsuits (last visited June 1, 2011) 
(providing links to lawsuits filed across nation). 
 7 See, e.g., Wood, supra note 2, at 205 (describing geographic limitations of 
current doctrine as “superficial”). But see Barton H. Thompson, The Public Trust 
Doctrine: A Conservative Reconstruction and Defense, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 47, 
67-68 (2006) (arguing that doctrine’s limitation to water-based resources is not 
arbitrary). 
 8 See Lazarus, Changing Conceptions, supra note 3, at 712-13. 
 9 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 7, at 67-68 (noting precedential and policy 
significance of doctrine’s confinement to aquatic resources). 
 10 For a recent attempt to find a role for the doctrine as a component of an overall 
environmental protection structure including positive law enactments, see generally 
Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating 
Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 749-750 (2006). 
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the difficult question of how codification of natural resource 
protection affects the continued vitality of the common law principle 
upon which that protection was originally grounded.11 
These tensions arise because the public trust doctrine both reflects 
fundamental instincts about the relationship of government to the 
nation’s natural resource heritage, and also suffers from an 
incompletely theorized doctrinal foundation and anxiety about judicial 
policy-making on technically complex and socially important issues. 
This state of affairs is only exacerbated when one considers advocates’ 
and scholars’ suggestions to increase the doctrine’s reach.12 
This Article considers whether these antagonistic characteristics of 
the doctrine can be partially harmonized by envisioning an expanded 
version of the doctrine as a canon of construction rather than a 
freestanding, legally binding, legal principle. Under this proposal, the 
protected status of public trust values, and government obligation to 
protect those values, would take the form of a background principle 
against which positive legislation and administrative actions are 
construed and reviewed. 
As a background principle, this proposed version of the doctrine 
would lack independent legal effect. Moreover, its character as a 
background principle means that its influence on actual cases would 
be limited by the underlying law for which it acts as an interpretive 
aid. Thus, its influence would be filtered through the types of issues 
courts are otherwise authorized to decide at the behest of plaintiffs 
otherwise authorized to sue,13 the law courts are otherwise mandated 
to apply, and the types of relief courts are otherwise authorized to 
provide. Rather than serving as a roving commission to overturn any 
natural resource allocation decision that a would-be plaintiff may 
dislike, this version of the doctrine would limit judicial action to those 
cases where binding law already authorizes such action. 
 
 11 Compare Klass, supra note 10 (arguing for role for public trust doctrine in 
conjunction with positive law environmental provisions), with Lazarus, Changing 
Conceptions, supra note 3, at 676-79 (arguing that increased positive law protection for 
environmental resources renders the doctrine obsolete). 
 12 See, e.g., Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to 
Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part I): Ecological 
Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43 (2009) (calling for public 
trust doctrine to be expanded to system of protection for natural resources against 
threats of climate change and ecological collapse). 
 13 Cf. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions, supra note 3, at 658-60 (arguing that 
expansions of federal standing law have contributed to obsolescing of the public trust 
doctrine). 
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So understood, this version of the public trust doctrine goes some 
way toward harmonizing the intuitive attractiveness of a public trust 
principle with critics’ concerns about judicial authority and 
competence in overseeing natural resource decision-making. This 
Article seeks to demonstrate that understanding the doctrine as a 
canon of construction constitutes more than an unprincipled, split-
the-difference compromise between a full-blown, legally binding rule 
and no rule at all. Instead, it argues that this understanding accurately 
reflects the force of the doctrine as a normatively attractive, deeply 
rooted, but ambiguously grounded legal principle that raises legitimate 
concerns about the role of the judiciary. In particular, the doctrine’s 
proposed character as a canon attempts to mitigate those latter 
concerns by tying its application to situations where firmly grounded 
law authorizes judicial action. 
This Article has modest aspirations. First, it does not call for the 
extension to dry land resources of a full-blown, substantive version of 
the public trust doctrine. Rather, it confines itself to proposing that 
courts interpret positive law enactments against the backdrop of a 
fundamental principle reflecting the goals of the public trust doctrine. 
Second, this Article calls for such an interpretive canon only in the 
context of judicial interpretation of positive law enactments, such as 
statutes, administrative regulations and interpretations of those 
regulations. There may also be good reasons for reading a public trust 
principle into a variety of common law rules; however, the concept of 
an interpretive canon fits uneasily with common law adjudication. 
Consistent with the Article’s incremental approach, it leaves for 
another day the question of the extent to which common law rules 
should be modified to include consideration of public trust values. 
Third, this Article does not purport to resolve some of the 
difficulties environmental advocates face when calling for an expanded 
use of the public trust doctrine. For example, critics of an expanded 
use of the doctrine cite its original emphasis on commercial activity to 
argue that using the doctrine in pursuit of resource conservation 
distorts its original focus. By proposing that courts adopt an 
interpretive canon based on the modern public trust doctrine, this 
Article avoids ultimate questions about what interests the doctrine 
should protect; for example, whether the doctrine should protect 
commercial uses or evolve away from such protection. Instead, 
because the canon is parasitic on the extant doctrine, it takes the scope 
of that extant doctrine as a given. Whether that doctrine should 
evolve, and if so, how, is beyond the scope of this Article. 
As a final preliminary point, this Article does not propose 
“downgrading” the extant, water-based public trust doctrine to the 
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status of an interpretive aid. Much of the justification for suggesting 
that we understand the doctrine as a canon of construction rests on 
the lack of a steady legal foundation for an “amphibian” public trust 
doctrine. Whatever one might say about the proposal’s ability to 
resolve that problem, it is unquestionable that the traditional, aquatic 
doctrine enjoys a long-recognized legal pedigree.14 This Article 
addresses only the possibility of extending that doctrine onto dry 
land15 in the more limited form of an interpretive canon. 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I briefly examines the 
foundations of the public trust doctrine, demonstrating that the 
doctrine has an ambiguous legal foundation. Part II explains that the 
ambiguity of the doctrine’s foundation makes it a good candidate for 
vindication in the form of a canon. It examines an analogy from 
constitutional law — the nondelegation doctrine — that features 
similar characteristics and has been vindicated as an analogous canon. 
Part III lays out the contours and operation of a public trust canon. It 
explains the scope of the proposed canon and offers some preliminary 
thoughts about its implementation. Part IV considers possible 
objections; based on those objections, it discerns and considers three 
criteria that the proposed canon must satisfy to gain acceptance. 
Finally, Part V considers the ultimate question: does the proposed 
canon promote the same values as the underlying doctrine? Answering 
that question requires a return to Part III’s consideration of what the 
public trust doctrine really means. Only by understanding what the 
underlying doctrine means can this Article ultimately conclude that a 
canon is an appropriate way to instantiate the doctrine’s basic 
principles in a judicially workable fashion. 
 
 14 See Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892). 
 15 Even though the traditional doctrine was merely limited to aquatic resources, 
but also to particular uses of those resources — fishing, navigation and commerce — 
the expansion of uses protected by the doctrine has become well recognized by courts. 
See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 465 (“[C]ases have extended the trust beyond the 
traditional purposes of commerce, navigation, and fishing, with the most common 
‘new’ purposes being various forms of recreation.”). Moreover, courts have expanded 
the scope of the water-based resources amenable to the trust beyond those suitable for 
navigation. See, e.g., id. at 465 (“[S]ome states have extended the coverage of the trust 
beyond those watercourses navigable for title.”). Thus, when this Article refers to an 
“extension” or “expansion” of the public trust doctrine, it intends to refer only to its 
extension or expansion to protect dry-land resources and uses. See infra text 
accompanying note 92 (explaining how doubly attenuated nature of preservation 
(rather than access) rights to non-water-based resources renders that expansion of 
doctrine a more problematic case for extension of legally binding version of rule). 
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I. THE UNSETTLED FOUNDATIONS OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
The public trust doctrine’s legal source remains unsettled. In 
addition to constituting a theoretical problem in itself, this uncertainty 
carries with it implications for the doctrine’s scope and legitimacy. 
As scholars have noted, the seminal cases establishing the doctrine 
in the United States do not clearly explain its foundations.16 By the 
mid-nineteenth century, it was established that the original thirteen 
states succeeded to the crown’s ownership of submerged lands under 
tidal waters.17 Soon thereafter the Supreme Court held that the same 
rule applied to newly admitted states via the “equal footing” 
doctrine.18 
With the ownership rule now applied to newly admitted states, the 
question then became the state’s ability to alienate its ownership or 
control of those lands. While other courts had addressed this question 
since the first half of the nineteenth century,19 it was not until the 
landmark 1892 case Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois that the 
Supreme Court explicitly held that states were limited in their ability 
to alienate such lands.20 Illinois Central is notoriously murky as to the 
foundations of the rule that prevented Illinois from conveying a large 
part of the Chicago lakefront to a railroad corporation. That decision 
has been described as resting on state common law,21 federal common 
law,22 the federal navigational servitude,23 and an inchoate concept of 
inalienable sovereignty.24 
 
 16 See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 453 (“Today, . . . after all of the words on 
the subject, two foundational issues concerning the traditional doctrine have still not 
been decided. The first matter is the source of the trust—where does it come from? 
The second is the scope and definition of the trust—what law defines the trust and 
what is the content of the trust?”). 
 17 See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842). The idea of royal ownership 
can be traced to the New Jersey case of Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821). The 
Martin Court found Arnold’s reasoning persuasive. See 41 U.S. at 418. 
 18 See Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 229 (1845). For a criticism of the equal 
footing doctrine, see Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 445-47. Despite his critique, 
Wilkinson concedes that the equal footing doctrine is well-settled law. See id. at 448. 
For a general discussion of the equal footing doctrine, see Steven Anderson, Idaho v. 
United States: Taking a Wrong Turn in the Jurisprudence of the Equal Footing Doctrine, 
38 IDAHO L. REV. 667, 670-74 (2002). 
 19 See supra note 17 (citing cases). 
 20 Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois,146 U.S. 387, 452-53 (1892). 
 21 Appelby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364 (1926). 
 22 See, e.g., Crystal S. Chase, The Illinois Central Public Trust Doctrine and Federal 
Common Law: An Unconventional View, 16 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 113, 
116 (2010) (concluding that “federal common law provides the strongest explanation” 
for the public trust doctrine). 
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The bare fact that Illinois Central has been described in so many 
disparate ways is troubling in itself, because it suggests a fundamental 
lack of consensus over the doctrine’s basis, and thus, its source of 
legitimacy. As a more practical matter, the confusion about the 
doctrine’s foundations makes it far more difficult — if not impossible 
— to reach stable, satisfactory conclusions about the precise role of 
the doctrine as a limit on government decision-making. These 
legitimacy and implementation issues present serious problems for 
those advocating its expansion. The doctrine is already subject to 
criticism for its anti-majoritarian cast, threat to private property, and 
alleged license to judges to make ad hoc judgments about resource 
conservation.25 These criticisms are even more salient when the 
foundations for that authority are largely opaque. 
Scholars struggle to provide a convincing argument about the 
doctrine’s foundations. If the doctrine, at least as expressed in Illinois 
Central, is based on general federal common law, then there is good 
reason to wonder if it should remain viable after Erie Railroad v. 
Tompkins26 rejected the concept of federal common law.27 If the 
doctrine is based on some broader federal interest, such as the federal 
navigational servitude, then presumably it exists as a matter of federal 
law. Yet aside from the fact that the Supreme Court itself has abjured 
it,28 the federal-law understanding is starkly inconsistent with state 
courts’ uneven acceptance of the doctrine. 
A state law foundation for the doctrine is equally perplexing. If the 
doctrine is based on state law, then one must investigate the state law 
source of that rule. A foundation in state common law raises the 
 
 23 See, e.g., George Smith & Michael Sweeney, The Public Trust Doctrine and 
Natural Law: Emanations Within a Penumbra, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307, 312-14 
(2006) (“From this rich history regarding governmental control of the waterways, the 
public trust doctrine officially emerged as an instrument of federal common law to 
preserve the public’s interest in free navigation and fishing.”); see also Wilkinson, 
supra note 1, at 458-59 (noting relationship between federal navigational servitude 
and federal constitution). 
 24 See, e.g., Wood, supra note 2, at 203 (explaining that commentators have 
discussed the Supreme Court’s public trust jurisprudence as based in a concept of 
inalienable sovereignty). 
 25 See generally Lazarus, Changing Conceptions, supra note 3 (illustrating a classic 
statement of this critique).  
 26 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 27 See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 455 (noting this criticism). 
 28 See Appelby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 394 (1926) (describing Illinois 
Central as based on Illinois law). See generally Chase, supra note 22 (arguing that 
public trust doctrine should be understood as resting on a species of federal common 
law). 
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problem of why courts sometimes view the doctrine as trumping 
legislation, given the principle that legislation can supersede the 
common law.29 Yet a state constitutional basis for the doctrine is also 
troubling because it raises the question of how such an unwritten 
constitutional doctrine interacts with more explicit state constitutional 
protections for the environment. Do those more explicit protections 
supersede the unwritten protections the doctrine provides? 
Conversely, if the doctrine exists as a matter of unwritten state 
constitutional law alongside such positive enactments, then what 
would be the effect (indeed, what would be the point) of enacting the 
more explicit provisions? Finally, if the doctrine is constitutional, yet 
unwritten, how did it appear in some state constitutions but not 
others; and how did it morph to account for the different 
environmental situations in the various states?30 None of these 
objections to the state constitutional foundation of the doctrine is 
fatal; indeed, I have suggested in earlier writing that state constitutions 
may provide the most appropriate home for public trust concepts.31 
Nevertheless, these objections raise difficult questions about the 
doctrine’s interaction with explicit state constitutional provisions. 
Finally, one might argue that the doctrine is fundamentally based on 
some inherent attribute of sovereignty. On this theory, the doctrine 
reflects the idea that public trust assets are such inherent possessions 
of the citizenry that the very nature of the people as sovereign forbids 
those assets’ alienation.32 This is, at the very least, an aggressive 
reading of the doctrine, placing it not only above day-to-day 
legislation, but also presumably above the ability of the people of a 
state to provide for the disposition of such assets in the state 
constitution itself. In a positivist age, such a natural law-type 
understanding of our constitutional order is jarring.33 
 
 29 See, e.g., San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179 (Ariz. 1999) 
(striking down Arizona legislation that attempted to eliminate the public trust 
doctrine from consideration in water rights adjudication in state). 
 30 See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public 
Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological 
Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 56 (2010) (noting differences between public trust 
doctrines in western states and those in eastern states).  
 31 See William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process-Based 
Constitutional Theory, The Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a Substantive 
Environmental Value, 45 UCLA L. REV. 385, 439-52 (1997). 
 32 See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶ 131, Alec L. v. 
Jackson, No. CV-112203 (N.D. Cal. filed May 4, 2011), 2011 WL 1675203, available at 
http://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/FEDERAL%20FILE%20STAMPED 
%20COMPLAINT.pdf. (making this argument as part of plaintiff’s complaint). 
 33 Cf. Strauss v. Horton, 46 Cal. 4th 364, 465-70 (2010) (rejecting argument that 
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These problematic foundations mean that we must think carefully 
before expanding the public trust doctrine. One possible approach is 
to conceptualize the doctrine as something less than a fully legally 
binding principle, in particular as an interpretive canon. The next Part 
considers this intuition — that a canon can legitimately vindicate an 
insecurely grounded legal principle. 
II. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AS A CANON OF CONSTRUCTION: THE 
PRELIMINARY ARGUMENT 
This Article considers the possibility of understanding the public 
trust doctrine, at least in part, as a canon of construction. Full 
consideration of this argument requires beginning with an explanation 
of the type of canon proposed here. 
Interpretive canons are well known in law. Such canons — for 
example, that statutes in derogation of the common law are narrowly 
construed — have long been a standard tool for courts engaged in 
statutory interpretation.34 Still, canons’ usefulness is clearly limited. 
Most notably, half a century ago Karl Llewellyn famously 
demonstrated their lack of determinate meaning when he highlighted 
pairs of canons that directly contradicted each other.35 Similarly, 
recent studies suggest that judges may use canons to reach their 
preferred outcome rather than as true aids to the interpretive task.36 
For his part, Justice Scalia has also expressed doubts about canons, on 
both judicial legitimacy37 and indeterminacy grounds.38 Nevertheless, 
courts continue to employ canons as useful interpretive tools, even if 
not decisive ones.39 
 
“inalienable” rights trump an otherwise proper amendment to state constitution). 
 34 See, e.g., Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 
GEO. L.J. 341, 344 (2010) (“Canons are integral to the process of interpretation. They 
have been used since antiquity, and their general contours have been remarkably 
stable over time.”). 
 35 See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and 
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 
(1950) (noting several juxtaposed canons). 
 36 See generally James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the 
Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2005) (studying six hundred 
Supreme Court workplace law cases from 1969–2003 and concluding that canons 
were used by justices to support statutory interpretations consistent with their pre-
existing preferences). 
 37 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 17-18 (1997). 
 38 See id. at 25-27, 29. 
 39 See Scott, supra note 34, at 345 (noting increased use of interpretive canons in 
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This Article considers whether the foundational nature of the 
principle underlying the public trust doctrine justifies considering that 
principle as a background principle, or canon, which influences how a 
court understands more firmly grounded law. The argument is that 
the principle underlying the public trust doctrine — that “social” uses 
of natural resources generate benefits that merit protection40 — is so 
important that it warrants consideration when courts construe laws or 
review government actions that affect those uses. As such, the public 
trust principle constitutes a background principle, or canon, against 
which those laws should be construed. 
A. The Ambiguous Legal Foundation for the Public Trust Doctrine 
Of course, if the principle underlying the public trust doctrine is so 
important, the obvious question is why it does not operate as a 
freestanding legal rule rather than a canon. And indeed it does operate 
as a freestanding legal rule, at least as applied to particular uses of 
certain resources, i.e., fishing, commerce, and navigation uses of water 
resources. As noted in Part I, this limited version of the rule is well 
established in American law, even if its precise grounding is unclear. 
Moreover, since Joseph Sax’s path-breaking 1970 article,41 courts, 
often following commentators’ suggestions, have expanded the 
doctrine’s scope to protect more uses and more resources.42 As a 
result, scholars today can point to a large number of states with 
vibrant public trust doctrines, some of which extend significantly 
beyond the scope of the traditional doctrine.43 
 
Supreme Court majority opinions over last decade). 
 40 See text accompanying infra notes 85-89. 
 41 Sax, supra note 3. 
 42 See, e.g., Marc Poirier, Modified Private Property: New Jersey’s Public Trust 
Doctrine, Private Development and Exclusion, and Shared Public Uses of Natural 
Resources, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVT’L L.J. 71, 84-91 (2006) (discussing New Jersey 
caselaw regarding recreation-based public trust claims for access to privately-owned 
beach property). 
 43 See, e.g., Mackenzie Keith, Judicial Protection for Beaches and Parks: The Public 
Trust Doctrine Above the High Water Mark, 16 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
165, 173-87 (2010) (discussing cases applying the public trust doctrine to dry-land 
resources); Deborah G. Musiker, Tom France & Lisa A. Hallenbeck, The Public Trust 
and Parens Patriae Doctrines: Protecting Wildlife in Uncertain Political Times, 16 PUB. 
LAND L. REV. 87 (1995) (arguing that public trust duties apply to wildlife 
conservation); Patrick S. Ryan, Application of the Public-Trust Doctrine and Principles of 
Natural Resource Management to Electromagnetic Spectrum, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 285 (2004) (arguing that electromagnetic spectrum is public resource 
capable of protection under public trust doctrine); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public 
Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 UC DAVIS L. REV. 269 (1980) (arguing that 
  
2012] The Public Trust Doctrine as an Interpretive Canon 705 
Still, problems remain. As Part I explained, the legal foundation for 
the doctrine remains murky. This murkiness is far less problematic in 
the context of water-based resources because, regardless of the 
confusion about its provenance, it is at least clear that some 
longstanding legal foundation justifies a judicially enforceable rule 
against alienation of at least some aquatic resources.44 Yet even here 
the vagueness of the rule’s underlying foundation creates confusion 
about the intensity and the nature of judicial review. For example, 
should courts simply ensure that government considered public trust 
values in its decision-making,45 or should they impose substantive 
limits on the impairment of those values?46 Does the rule apply solely 
to administrative agencies, or does the rule limit legislatures as well?47 
Or is the reverse true?48 Indeed, is the rule somehow so foundational 
that it limits the ability of the people of a state to impair public trust 
values by enacting state constitutional provisions? 
The problems associated with the doctrine’s unclear foundations 
become even more acute when one moves beyond water and onto dry-
land applications. While early state court cases and Illinois Central 
provide an explicit limit on alienation of water-based resources, those 
cases fail to provide a solid legal foundation for judicial protection of 
 
public trust doctrine applies to federal parklands). 
 44 See Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 428-39 (noting particular importance of 
watercourses to uses that eventually came to be protected under public trust 
doctrine). See generally supra Part I (noting both the venerability of the public trust 
principle in American law and also the variety of possible foundations for that 
principle).  
 45 See, e.g., In re Contested Case on Water Use Permit Application, 174 P.3d 320 
(Haw. 2007) (requiring careful, open deliberation before water use permit would be 
given). 
 46 See, e.g., Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1031 (Alaska 1999) (“[t]he purpose 
of the public trust doctrine was not to grant the legislature ultimate authority over 
natural resource management, but rather to prevent the state from giving out 
‘exclusive grants or special privilege as was so frequently the case in ancient royal 
tradition.’ ”) (emphasis in original); Citizens For Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State, 
103 P.3d 203, 205 (Wash. 2004) (noting that legislation affecting public trust values 
requires “heightened” judicial scrutiny). 
 47 See San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz. 1999) 
(striking down Arizona legislation that attempted to eliminate public trust doctrine 
from consideration in water rights adjudication in the state). 
 48 See, e.g., Jurisich v. Jenkins, 749 So. 2d 597 (La. 1999) (holding state 
constitutional provision enshrining public trust-type obligation on state was aimed at 
legislature, not executive branch); Conservation Law Found. v. LaPointe, No. Civ.A. 
AP-2003-21, 2004 WL 1598922 (Me. Super. Ct. Jun. 14, 2004) (finding “more 
demanding” standard required of government action by Maine public trust doctrine 
applies only to legislation, not administrative action pursuant to legislation). 
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dry-land public trust values. It is true that scholars have made 
compelling arguments analogizing aquatic and dry-land interests for 
purposes of their public trust values, and noting the doctrine’s 
inherent flexibility.49 However, scholars have noted that, taken to their 
logical conclusion, these arguments would give courts wide-ranging 
power to balance public trust values and other values, such as private 
ownership, economic development, and even preservation of the 
public trust asset itself.50 These objections create a serious legitimacy 
problem for courts considering whether to bring the public trust 
doctrine onto shore. The result, then, is a principle with deep 
resonance in American law, only partially enforced as a legally binding 
rule, and whose legal foundation is seriously under-determined. 
B. The Non-Delegation Analogy 
1. The General Argument 
In such a case where a fundamental principle is under-enforced 
because of legitimacy concerns and practical difficulties, it may be 
appropriate for courts to rely on a substantive interpretive canon.51 As 
one scholar noted, it is no great innovation to suggest that courts rely 
on substantive canons as tools in giving effect to otherwise under-
enforced legal values.52 
 
 49 See, e.g., Keith, supra note 43 (discussing cases expanding the public trust 
doctrine to new resource uses). 
 50 Cf. Marc Poirier, Natural Resources, Congestion, and the Feminist Future: Aspects 
of Frischmann’s Theory of Infrastructure Resources, 35 ECOL. L.Q. 179, 189-192 (2008) 
(explaining that New Jersey cases finding a public trust-based right to beach access 
had to consider various factors, including congestion and preservation of natural 
resource values, when delineating the contours of the right). 
 51 Two scholars have defined “substantive canons” as follows:  
Substantive canons, unlike their linguistic counterparts, are generally meant 
to reflect a judicially preferred policy position. They are not predicated on 
what the words of a statute should be presumed to mean, or what a rational 
Congress presumptively must have meant when it chose to use them. 
Rather, substantive canons reflect judicially-based concerns, grounded in the 
courts’ understanding of how to treat statutory text with reference to 
judicially perceived constitutional priorities, pre-enactment common law 
practices, or specific statutorily based policies.  
Brudney & Corey, supra note 36, at 13.  
 52 See Richard Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69, 96 (2009) 
(“Legislation scholars have long recognized that substantive canons can serve as a 
backdoor mechanism to enforce ‘underenforced’ constitutional norms through 
statutory interpretation.”). 
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An example of a substantive interpretive canon is the non-
delegation principle in constitutional law. As a judicially enforceable 
rule, the prohibition on Congress delegating its legislative powers is 
largely moribund. No Supreme Court case since 1935 has found a 
violation of the non-delegation rule.53 In addition, more flexible (and 
potentially more meaningful) versions of the doctrine have also been 
rejected by the Court in favor of the formalistic “intelligible principle” 
test that makes legislation almost impervious to judicial strike-
downs.54 Even Justices who express skepticism about important 
components of the modern administrative state, such as Justice Scalia, 
have also acquiesced in the doctrine’s disuse.55 At the same time, the 
federal rule against delegation of legislative power appears, at best, 
only as an implication of the statement in the Constitution’s preamble 
announcing “We the People’s” establishment of the federal 
government.56 Yet the principle that Congress, not administrative 
agencies, should make the fundamental policy choices for the federal 
government remains a basic assumption firmly embedded in our law. 
In response, the Supreme Court has used different methods to apply 
the non-delegation principle. First, it has used the specter of the 
formal non-delegation rule (which has never been officially discarded) 
as a general justification for construing broad delegations more 
narrowly.57 Second, and relatedly, the Court has employed the 
principle underlying the doctrine to craft a set of interpretive canons 
that give narrow constructions to particular types of congressional 
grants of power. Cass Sunstein has identified several such canons; for 
 
 53 See, e.g., Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 420 (1935) (striking down a 
section of the National Industrial Recovery Act as violating the non-delegation 
doctrine); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935) 
(same). 
 54 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 472-73 (2001) (rejecting 
Court of Appeals’ approach to non-delegation, in which overly-broad statute’s non-
delegation problem could be cured by agency itself promulgating regulations limiting 
its discretion). 
 55 See id. at 459; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 927 (1997) (“This 
Court has not been notably successful in describing [the line between “making” and 
“enforcing” law]”). 
 56 U.S. CONST. pmbl; see also Cass Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 
98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 331 (1999) [hereinafter Sunstein, Clean Air] (arguing that the 
“standard view” of the nondelegation doctrine as a “core part of the original 
constitution” is inconsistent with the constitutional text). 
 57 See Indus. Union Dep’t AFL-CIO v. Am. Petro. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980) 
(plurality opinion); Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 
(1974). 
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example, the canon against construing statutes to apply 
extraterritorially absent clear congressional authority.58 
Sunstein’s analysis responds to concerns that find reasonably close 
analogues in the public trust context. Sunstein notes several traits that 
characterize the non-delegation doctrine. He argues that the non-
delegation doctrine suffers from questions about its legal pedigree,59 its 
democratic basis,60 and judicial competence to implement it.61 
Nevertheless, he notes that the principle underlying the doctrine is 
valuable and deeply rooted in American law. Therefore he seeks to 
identify interpretive canons that implement that principle at the more 
judicially manageable and legitimate level of statutory interpretation. 
These traits also characterize the public trust doctrine. Part I already 
noted the concerns about the public trust doctrine’s legal foundation, 
its antidemocratic nature, and the difficulty courts encounter in 
implementing it. Yet the doctrine — at least in its water-based form — 
is an accepted part of American law. Indeed, the public trust doctrine 
is a fundamental part of American law; so fundamental that it is 
sometimes thought to inhere in the very notion of sovereignty.62 
Moreover, the general principle underlying the public trust doctrine 
— that the public, qua public, benefits from certain resources held in 
common — is not just deeply ingrained in American law, but also 
present across broadly different subject-areas. For example, First 
Amendment jurisprudence insists on a mythic story in which certain 
types of government property, known as “public forums”, are 
maintained “in trust” for the people to exercise their speech rights.63 
Given the inherently communal nature of speech, the First 
 
 58 See Cass Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI.L. REV. 315, 333 (2000) 
[hereinafter Sunstein, Nondelegation].  
 59 Id. at 322-23. 
 60 Id. at 323-26. 
 61 Id. at 326-28. 
 62 See sources cited in supra note 2. 
 63 See, e.g., Hague v. Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (“[S]treets 
and parks. . . have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time 
out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts 
between citizens, and discussing public questions.”). But see Int’l Soc’y for Krishna 
Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 692, 696 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The 
Court’s analysis [confining “traditional public forums” to the established categories of 
streets, sidewalks and parks] rests on an inaccurate view of history. The notion that 
traditional public forums are properties that have public discourse as their principal 
purpose is a most doubtful fiction.”). See generally Karl Baker & Dwight Merriam, 
Indelible Public Interests in Property: The Public Trust and the Public Forum, 32 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 275 (2005) (discussing relationship between public trust doctrine 
and First Amendment public forum doctrine). 
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Amendment analogy is more resonant than it might seem at first 
blush. Just as “traditional public forums” allow social interaction via 
speech, resources protected by the public trust doctrine also enable 
sociability by encouraging commerce.64 
2. Non-Delegation as Non-Alienation 
An even closer analogy unites the public trust and non-delegation 
principles. At base, both restrict the alienability of a resource thought 
to reside most appropriately with the public as a whole.65 The public 
trust doctrine restricts government from alienating public trust assets 
and destroying public trust uses. Similarly, the non-delegation 
principle restricts Congress’s ability to alienate its authority to 
legislate. In both cases, the ultimate theoretical foundation for the 
restriction rests on the concept of popular sovereignty. In the case of 
the public trust doctrine, the public’s sovereignty is thought to rest in 
the public’s “ownership” of the trust asset (with the government 
merely acting as trustee).66 In the case of the non-delegation principle, 
the concept rests on “We the People’s” possession of sovereign power 
and, thus, the imperative to respect our decision to vest a part of that 
power in Congress, without further alienation.67 
The anti-alienation analogy goes further. While the non-delegation 
doctrine is usually viewed as a limitation on Congress’s power to 
delegate decision-making authority to administrative agencies, an 
important strain of the doctrine addresses limits on congressional 
power to delegate such authority to private parties.68 While the 
Supreme Court has not struck down a statute on non-delegation 
grounds since 1935, it has occasionally noted that the statute it was 
 
 64 See infra note 87. 
 65 Thanks to Chris Serkin for suggesting that I explore this point further. 
 66 The concept of trusteeship is more than a legal fiction with no bite. Indeed, 
commentators have seized on the trustee concept to argue for expansions of the 
doctrine. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 2, at 205 (calling for extension of doctrine’s 
geographic scope via expansion of government’s “fiduciary duty” to protect “all 
natural assets”). 
 67 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1 (“All legislative powers herein granted shall be 
vested in a Congress of the United States.”); see also J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF 
CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 141, at 380 (P. Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967) (“The Legislative cannot 
transfer the Power of Making Laws to any other hands. For it being but a delegated 
Power from the People, they, who have it, cannot pass it over to others.”). 
 68 See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 53 
(1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups] (noting importance of this feature of 
statute struck down in Schechter Poultry). 
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upholding did not delegate government authority to private parties.69 
The Court’s apparent concern with delegation to private parties 
mirrors the public trust doctrine’s concern with government alienating 
the public’s interest in public trust assets. In this sense, the concern 
underlying the non-delegation doctrine goes beyond the agency-based 
theory under which “We the People” vested federal legislative power 
in Congress. Rather, the Court has expressed special concern about 
delegating legislative power to private parties. This suggests an 
imperative that the People retain sovereign control over legislative 
power. If Congress delegated power to non-accountable private 
parties, this would frustrate the People’s sovereign control.70 
 
 69 See, e.g., United States v. Rock Royal Coop., 307 U.S. 533, 577-78 (1939) (“The 
objection is made that [the legislative scheme, in which approval of agricultural 
marketing orders turns in part on the approval of the relevant producing community] 
is an unlawful delegation to producers of the legislative power to put an order into 
effect in a market. In considering this question, we must assume that the Congress 
had the power to put this Order into effect without the approval of anyone. Whether 
producer approval by election is necessary or not, a question we reserve, a 
requirement of such approval would not be an invalid delegation.”); Currin v. 
Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1939) (“This is not a case where a group of producers 
may make the law and force it upon a minority or where a prohibition of an 
inoffensive and legitimate use of property is imposed not by the legislature but by 
other property owners.”) (citations omitted). It should be pointed out that the Court’s 
reasoning here is not as precise as one might wish. Currin, upon which Rock Royal 
relies, explains that when Congress has made the fundamental decision, it does not 
violate the non-delegation doctrine for the statute to make the effectiveness of any 
such decision turn on the actions of a private group (such as a group of voters or a 
group of commodities producers who will be subject to a marketing order). See Rock 
Royal Coop., 307 U.S. at 578 n.64. According to the Court, this is because “it is 
Congress that exercises its legislative authority in making the regulation and in 
prescribing the conditions of its application.” Currin, 306 U.S. at 16. The Court then 
continued, “The required favorable vote [of the commodities growers] is one of these 
conditions.” Id. Ultimately, this simply reduces to the same argument that is made in 
the context of delegations to administrative agencies: there is no non-delegation 
problem because Congress itself has provided the fundamental value choice — the 
intelligible principle required of all delegations. Indeed, the case setting forth the 
“intelligible principle” standard, while doing so in the context of a delegation to the 
President, nevertheless cited the example of state legislative decisions to enact certain 
policies upon the approval of a sub-group of the electorate. See id. (quoting J.W. 
Hampton Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407 (1928)).  
 70 Indeed, to widen the analogy to again include speech resources, one might note 
that government is similarly limited in its power to alienate traditional public forums. 
See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983) (“[T]he destruction of 
public forum status . . . is at least presumptively impermissible.”); ACLU v. City of Las 
Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1105 (9th Cir. 2003). The government-owned property in both 
of these cases was described by the relevant courts as a traditional public forum. See 
Grace, 461 U.S. at 179-80 (concluding that sidewalk in front of Supreme Court 
building, the property at issue, is traditional public forum); ACLU, 333 F.3d at 1105 
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Like the non-delegation principle, the public trust doctrine reflects a 
deep legal principle limiting government power to alienate the 
relevant resource out of public ownership.71 But also like non-
delegation, the public trust doctrine suffers from concerns about its 
precise legal foundation, its democratic legitimacy, and judicial 
competence to implement it. Therefore, it is appropriate to at least 
consider the possibility of treating the public trust doctrine similarly, 
i.e., as a canon of construction. 
C. A Word of Caution on the Importation of the Under-Enforcement 
Rationale 
Despite the parallels between the non-delegation canons and the 
public trust canon, one should remain cautious about the uncritical 
importation of the under-enforcement rationale for an interpretive 
canon.72 Despite its lack of novelty,73 the claim that interpretive 
canons are appropriate to implement under-enforced legal values 
needs to be considered carefully before one moves on to considering 
the specifics of the proposed public trust canon. In particular, this 
justification for canons, while attractive, nevertheless raises a difficult 
question: what is the relationship between a legal doctrine and its 
underlying principles? In other words, if the underlying legal rule is, 
for some reason, incapable of competent and legitimate judicial 
implementation, then does enforcement of what Judge Posner has 
derided as a “penumbral” canon74 reflect legitimate judicial flexibility? 
Or does use of such a canon constitute an ultra vires substitution of an 
enforceable, but illegitimate, rule for a legitimate rule that courts lack 
the competence to enforce? 
The answer to these questions turn on the characteristics of the 
underlying legal principle. For example, Sunstein’s approval of 
interpretive canons construing legislation to avoid excessive 
delegations turns in large part on the theory that those canons 
vindicate what he called “the framers’ basic project of linking 
 
(noting that Fremont Street in Las Vegas, the property at issue, is traditional public 
forum). 
 71 See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. 
 72 See supra Part II.B (explaining that difficult-to-enforce legal principle is 
sometimes best implemented as interpretive canon rather than substantive rule). 
 73 See Hasen, supra note 52, at 96. 
 74 Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 285 (Harvard 
1985) (complaining about enforcement of “penumbral Constitution” in which courts 
enforce, not given constitutional provision per se, but penumbral version of it, which 
itself is not constitutional requirement). 
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individual rights and interests to institutional design.”75 This is a goal 
he described as “a central aspiration of the constitutional structure.”76 
But this justification simply raises another question: are courts 
legitimately in the business of enforcing “basic project[s]” and “central 
aspiration[s]” rather than law? 
That question returns our focus to the underlying legal rule the 
canon proposes to enforce. For example, perhaps Sunstein is correct in 
justifying his non-delegation canons by reference to an overall 
understanding of what the framers were hoping to accomplish with 
the Constitution. As a matter of history or appropriate interpretive 
method, perhaps the framers are best understood as having attempted 
to protect rights by means of institutional design.77 If so, then perhaps 
that underlying goal is appropriate for judges to pursue, even if they 
have to implement it via canons rather than whatever non-delegation 
rule is textually grounded. 
But does a similar justification warrant judicial use of an interpretive 
canon enforcing the public trust doctrine? To what “project” and to 
whose “aspirations” would we look in determining whether a public 
trust canon is justifiable? If the public trust principle is a rule of 
common law, or even a rule of unwritten state constitutional law (in 
the sense that it inheres in the very notion of sovereignty), then what 
force is there to the argument that a canon helps implement an overall 
coherent picture of the law, analogous to Sunstein’s “basic project” or 
“central aspiration” of the Constitution? 
A similar concern arises when considering a much more pedestrian 
question: what value does a given canon vindicate when it is justified 
as an implementation of a broader legal principle? Leaving aside talk 
of “basic projects” and “central aspirations,” Sunstein’s non-delegation 
canons implement a text — the statements in the Preamble and Article 
I in which “We the People”78 vest “all [federal] legislative powers” in 
Congress.79 By contrast, the canon proposed here implements a non-
textual principle — the idea, of uncertain provenance, scope, and legal 
 
 75 Sunstein, Nondelegation, supra note 58, at 339. 
 76 Id. 
 77 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (observing that 
federalism is designed, at base, to protect liberties of people, not for state officials 
themselves); Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 416 U.S. 919, 959-67 
(1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (concluding that legislative veto that singled out 
named individuals for adverse treatment constituted adjudication by Congress, which 
was inappropriate given Congress’s lack of capacity to protect the rights of single 
individuals). 
 78 U.S. CONST., PREAMBLE. 
 79 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 1. 
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effect, that certain resources are inherently public and, thus, that 
government is limited in its ability to alienate them. This difference 
reflects the same insight as that developed in the previous paragraph: 
namely, that one cannot uncritically cite concerns about judicial 
manageability of underlying principles to justify any interpretive 
canon that points in the same direction as that underlying principle. 
Rather, context — in particular, the nature and status of the 
underlying principle — matters. 
Realizing that context matters means that we are confronting a 
bigger question than the (difficult enough) one of whether a public 
trust interpretive canon is justified by judicial manageability and 
legitimacy concerns with the underlying doctrine itself. That original 
problem remains, of course, and this Article will address it. However, 
the answer may provide raw material for broader examinations of 
other canons that are justified on similar judicial competence and 
legitimacy grounds. Thus, this Article’s analysis may provide a case 
study of the circumstances under which a “penumbral canon”80 may 
be justified on the ground that enforcement of the actual legal rule lies 
beyond the judicial ken. As explained above, such justifications must 
rely heavily on the context of the underlying legal principle, and how 
the proposed canon relates to that principle. 
This Article seeks to provide this context while illuminating the 
canon itself. In other words, as Part III examines how the public trust 
canon would operate, it also considers how the nature of the 
underlying public trust principle influences the canon’s outlines. 
Thus, Part III aspires to justify the public trust canon not just by 
explaining how it would work in practice, but also by revealing how 
the canon’s outlines are influenced by, and compliment, the 
underlying principle it seeks to implement. In so doing, this argument 
attempts to provide a template for more nuanced application of the 
standard judicial manageability and legitimacy arguments for 
analogous canons. After a pause in Part IV to consider some practical 
questions about the canon’s legitimacy, workability, and actual impact, 
the Article returns, in Part V, to the ultimate question of how the 
public trust doctrine should be understood. Only by understanding 
that underlying legal doctrine can we truly determine whether the 
proposed canon is sound, both as a matter of practicality and deeper 
legal coherence. 
 
 80 See POSNER, supra note 74, at 285. 
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III. A PUBLIC TRUST CANON IN ACTION 
This Article proposes that courts construe statutes and review 
administrative action threatening public trust values against the 
backdrop of a commitment to the protection of those values. This 
proposal requires delineation of both the canon’s scope — the 
interests and resources to which it applies — and the canon’s 
operation — the mechanism by which it would be applied. 
Understanding the canon’s proper scope and operation requires 
understanding the underlying public trust doctrine. This insight may 
be counter-intuitive: at first blush, applying a canon requiring a softer, 
less authoritative application of a legal rule should not demand that 
we have a deep understanding of that rule, as long as we know enough 
about it to apply its principles as a background interpretive aid. As will 
become clear, however, the proper operation and, indeed, the 
legitimacy of a public trust canon ultimately turn on a deeper 
understanding of the public trust doctrine itself. 
For this reason, this Part begins with a brief examination of the 
theoretical foundations of the modern public trust doctrine in 
American law. This examination is necessarily incomplete; volumes 
have been written about the doctrine’s foundations, and a 
comprehensive examination of that question would distort this 
Article’s focus on the canon proposal. Nevertheless, the argument for 
the interpretive canon requires at least some preliminary 
understanding of the underlying doctrine. After providing that 
understanding, this Part then turns to the canon’s scope and 
operation. 
A. Groundings for the Public Trust Doctrine 
The primary impetus behind the public trust doctrine, both in its 
more traditional81 and expanded82 forms, is to keep certain property as 
a common. As Carol Rose demonstrated a quarter-century ago, certain 
stories of commonly held property are not “tragedies” of unfettered, 
every-man-for-himself resource exploitation,83 but instead, comedies 
— in the sense of having positive, not negative, outcomes.84 In other 
 
 81 See Rose, supra note 1, at 762-74. 
 82 See, e.g., Keith, supra note 43 (applying Carol Rose’s explanations for historical 
identification of some water-based resources as public trust property to dry-land 
resources).  
 83 See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968) 
(explaining the concept of “the tragedy of the commons”). 
 84 See Rose, supra note 1, at 721-23. 
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words, the story of the commons is not a story of inevitable spoliation 
of assets held in common; rather, sometimes society thrives when 
property is held in common. 
In explaining the benefits of common ownership of certain property, 
Rose identified two criteria that historically justified judicial elevation 
of the public’s use rights in an asset over private property exclusion 
rights: (1) the existence of “holdout” problems, where one landowner 
can frustrate the completion of a project promoting public trust 
values; and (2) the superior value of the property when made available 
for public uses, rather than reduced to private control and public 
exclusion.85 Thus, for example, Rose traces the centrality of rivers as 
public trust resources based on her understanding of the holdout 
problems inherent in private ownership of a resource that, like a river, 
cannot be moved.86 Similarly, she explains how commerce emerged as 
a socializing activity that created net benefits to the public at large.87 
Rose’s explanation explicitly acknowledges the evolving nature of 
these factors, in particular, the characteristic of a type of property as 
conducive to sociability.88 Thus, while these factors provide the 
foundation for the traditional doctrine’s geographic scope and set of 
protected uses, their application over time may lead to different results 
and an expanded – or at least a different – set of protected resources 
and uses.89 
Over the last third of the twentieth century a second set of protected 
interests, the public interest in natural resource management 
(including management of dry-land resources), came to be accepted as 
legitimate objects of the doctrine. These interests are related to those 
grounded in the historical version of the public trust doctrine because 
they refer back to a similar (though not identical) set of resources – 
natural resources – that today perform the socializing function Rose 
 
 85 See id. at 749-50, 774-81, (explaining nature of “holdout” problems). 
 86 See id. at 749-61. 
 87 See id. at 775-77. For a related, but more theoretical, discussion of this issue, 
see generally Benedict Kingsbury & Benjamin Straumann, The State of Nature and 
Commercial Sociaibility in Early Modern International Legal Thought, 2011 available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1753021.  
 88 See Rose, supra note 1 at 777-81. 
 89 With regard to commerce, for example, it may well be that commerce has 
become so prevalent and performed in so many physical and virtual venues that that 
holdout problems have been rendered moot. However, Rose herself suggests that the 
sociability effects of commerce remain, given her observation that “[c]ommerce still 
seems to be our quintessential mode of sociability,” because “[d]espite its appeal to 
self-interest, it also inculcates rules, understandings, and standards of behavior 
enforced by reciprocity of advantage.” Id. at 776. 
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identified as underpinning the classic doctrine.90 But they are different 
in that they play an additional, distinct, role, as objects of preservation 
rather than of exploitation. This preservative use, while capable of 
being shoehorned into Rose’s socializing role, is fundamentally 
different.91 The connection between these modern interests and the 
traditional interests the doctrine protects is thus doubly attenuated: 
the class of protected resources is expanded to dry-land resources, and 
the public trust use is altered from public access to preservation, with 
or without public access.92 
Despite these differences between the traditional and modern 
versions of the doctrine, a unifying thread exists in the argument that, 
because both conservation and some access uses accrue to the public 
generally, they both tend to be systematically undervalued in the 
political process.93 The political weakness of diffuse interests is well 
known. In constitutional law, courts have sometimes described the 
phenomenon of small harms accruing to a large number of persons as 
 
 90 See, e.g., Keith, supra note 43 (applying sociability idea to call for public trust 
doctrine protection for dry-land resources). 
 91 For example, the recent climate change lawsuits relying on the public trust 
doctrine apply a pure resource conservation/management theory of the doctrine, 
which at one level conflicts squarely with the use-based theories offered by Rose. Cf. 
supra note 6, at 15-16. An often-cited example of the differing foci of these two 
theories is the concurring opinion by an Oregon Supreme Court justice who agreed 
with the decision to uphold an airport expansion plan against a public trust-based 
challenge on the ground that aviation constituted “commerce” and was thus a 
legitimate public trust use. Morse v. Or. Div. of State Lands, 590 P.2d 709, 711, 716 
(Or. 1979) (Bryson, J., concurring) (reasoning that airport expansion is consistent 
with the public trust doctrine because it promotes commerce and possible air 
“navigation”). 
One might try to shoehorn the conservation/management idea of the doctrine into a 
use-based theory by viewing climate resource conservation as a “use” that, literally, 
helps preserve humanity’s continued existence. But this appears to stretch the concept 
of use quite far. A more justifiable connection might focus on the superior value of 
these resources in their natural state, given the role they play in that condition in 
ensuring the supreme public good of continued survival. 
 92 Indeed, public access may well pose a stark conflict with preservation values. 
See Poirier, supra note 50 at 189-192 (noting one scholar’s explanation of how a state 
court considering expansion of the public trust doctrine to dry sand beaches had to 
balance traditional public trust values with preservation of the resource itself). 
 93 See generally Sax, supra note 3, at 561 (noting this phenomenon). I have written 
about the connection between this understanding of the public trust doctrine and 
classic process-based equal protection review. See Araiza, supra note 31, at 403-30. 
This is not to say that Sax’s view reflects modern realities; that issue is considered 
later. See infra Part IV.C.2. At this point, the argument is simply that if Sax’s view is 
still accurate, then it presumably applies to conservation uses of trust resources as 
much as to access uses. 
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an exception to the general rule that a democratic political process can 
generally be trusted to reflect the public’s preferences.94 Bruce 
Ackerman relied on a similar understanding of politics when he called 
for a reworking of the famous Carolene Products95 formula for strict 
scrutiny.96 Ackerman called for courts to recognize the relative 
political weakness suffered not by “discrete and insular” minorities, as 
the formula originally stated, but by diffuse minorities, which he 
argued suffer special handicaps when organizing politically.97 
Similarly, in its path-breaking decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton 
Park v. Volpe,98 the Supreme Court acknowledged the ease with which 
publicly-held assets, such as parkland, would be sacrificed when the 
alternative was impairment of privately held assets.99 
Public trust values are similarly diffuse and, thus, susceptible to the 
same sort of political weakness.100 To the extent that the public trust 
doctrine constitutes a species of political process-based judicial 
review,101 it helps explain both Rose’s theory that that the traditional 
doctrine flowed from the net gains that flowed from putting certain 
property to public uses, and the modern doctrine’s focus on recreation 
and conservation. 
For these reasons, one fundamental characteristic of the public trust 
principle informing the proposed interpretive canon is the idea that 
public trust values are at risk of being systematically undervalued in 
the political and administrative process. This dynamic may be 
somewhat less salient today than it was a generation ago, given the rise 
of a vibrant environmental movement and increased public awareness 
of the importance of public trust assets. But these developments have 
not progressed to the point where courts can describe the special risks 
 
 94 See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 201 n.18 (1994) 
(discounting, for dormant commerce clause purposes, fact that price increase in milk 
caused by discriminatory tax and subsidy scheme would be felt by in-state consumers, 
concluding that effect would be too small to be noticed and provoke political 
opposition). 
 95 United States v. Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 96 See id. at 152 n.4; Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 
713, 717-18 (1985). 
 97 See Ackerman, supra note 96, at 723-24. 
 98 Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
 99 Id. at 412-13.  
 100 Whether and to what degree statutory and administrative law developments 
have obviated this problem is addressed later in this Article. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 101 See generally Araiza, supra note 31, at 403-430 (considering this claim).  
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those assets run in the political-administrative process as a mere 
historical artifact.102 
B. The Scope of the Canon 
At one level, the scope of the proposed canon presents a 
straightforward issue. The proposal calls for the canon to apply to dry-
land resources, a fact that seems to answer the question about its 
scope. But bringing all non-aquatic assets within the scope of the 
proposed canon would make the canon exceptionally broad. Such a 
broad reading is neither essential nor a logical outgrowth of the canon 
idea. Because the canon is parasitic on the underlying doctrine, the 
limits that inhere in the underlying doctrine curb the canon itself. 
For the purposes of this Article, the most important limits on the 
underlying doctrine relate not to its geographic scope, but to the scope 
of protected uses. The traditional doctrine protects fishing, navigation, 
and commerce.103 While many of these uses do not find obvious 
analogues in dry-land resources, the recreational and conservation 
uses that the doctrine protects surely do. Similarly, the political under-
representation theory that undergirds the doctrine in both its more 
traditional and modern versions104 provides yet another appropriate 
limitation on the canon’s scope. 
For these reasons, a defensible case can be made for demarcating the 
scope of the proposed canon by reference to particular protected uses 
and the likelihood that those uses may be systematically ignored in the 
legislative-administrative process. This scope is not laid out with 
perfect detail. But this should not disqualify the canon from 
consideration. The very idea of a penumbral canon protecting a broad 
but vague underlying legal value necessarily implies some vagueness 
with regard to the canon’s operational scope. 
 
 102 Compare Lazarus, Changing Conceptions, supra note 3, at 658-91 (arguing legal 
developments over last 40 years obviated need for relying on public trust doctrine to 
correct political dysfunction), with infra Part IV.C.2 (considering Lazarus’s argument). 
 103 E.g., Tim Eichenberg, Climate Change and the Public Trust Doctrine: Using an 
Ancient Doctrine to Adapt to Rising Sea Levels in San Francisco Bay, 3 GOLDEN GATE U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 243, 247 (2010) (noting those traditional uses). 
 104 See Araiza, supra note 31, at 413-30 (examining the political under-
representation argument for judicial protection of public trust resources). 
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C. Implementing the Canon 
1. Introduction 
With the canon’s scope generally laid out, the question then 
becomes its operation — the mechanism by which it would be 
applied. At first blush, one might think that this question raises the 
longstanding issue of whether the public trust doctrine provides 
substantive protection or simply requires government to consider 
public trust values when making a decision.105 However, this approach 
misses the point of applying the doctrine as a canon. When 
functioning as a canon, the doctrine does not have independent 
meaning; instead, it operates to influence the interpretation of other 
independent legal sources. 
In one sense, this insight simply means that the 
substantive/procedural decision is pushed down to the level of the 
particular legal rule for which the canon acts as an interpretive aid. 
Rather than the doctrine acting on its own as a particular type of 
check on government action, a canon implementing the doctrine 
might be understood as placing a thumb on the scale in favor of the 
public trust value, in whatever form the underlying legal rule 
prescribes. For example, a substantive legal rule (say, a water rights 
rule) would be interpreted with at least some additional weight on the 
public trust side of whatever balancing the rule mandates. Similarly, a 
procedural requirement would be interpreted as mandating an 
especially probing inquiry into whether the government actor carefully 
considered the public trust values at stake in the underlying 
substantive decision. 
However, even this approach is too simplistic. Implementation of 
the proposed canon may require more nuanced consideration by a 
court. For example, applying a public trust canon does not inevitably 
mean that a court required to balance public trust and other interests 
would simply place a thumb on the scale of the public trust value. 
Rather, a court could deploy the canon in the manner it thought most 
appropriate to vindicate the public trust value at issue, consistent with 
the policy choices the construed law imposes. 
The model for this approach is federal administrative law as it 
developed in the 1970s. During that era, courts struggling to vindicate 
the Administrative Procedure Act’s (“APA’s”)106 promise of reasoned 
decision-making focused both on holding agencies to a strict reading 
 
 105 See, e.g., Coplan, supra note 2, at 304 (citing cases taking both approaches). 
 106 5 U.S.C. § 551, et. seq. (2011). 
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of the APA’s procedural requirements and ensuring that the final 
agency decisions were carefully reasoned.107 Thus, rather than rigidly 
confining their review to either process or substance, these courts 
recognized the effects each had on the other and performed their 
review functions accordingly.108 In particular, procedural fairness was 
considered crucial to reasoned decision-making, while reasoned 
decision-making was, in large part, equated with procedurally careful 
decision-making.109 Similarly, if courts apply the proposed canon, they 
can act creatively to vindicate the underlying public trust principle, 
using the means that best correspond to the underlying legal duties 
found in the construed law. 
The key to implementing such a canon lies in the nature of the 
underlying public trust principle, the nature of the construed legal 
rule, and the identity of the government actor prescribing that legal 
rule. Canons have no independent legal stature; their effect lies solely 
in influencing how binding legal rules are construed and 
implemented. Understanding that influence requires understanding 
both inputs — the principle promoted by the canon and the legal rule 
upon which the canon acts. It also requires an awareness of the nature 
of the actor enacting that rule. This latter factor helps courts stay 
within their appropriate bounds when applying the canon, since the 
appropriateness of a court’s method turns, in part, on the proper 
relationship between the court and the entity promulgating the 
particular legal rule at issue.110 
The previous subsection briefly set forth a preliminary 
understanding of the public trust doctrine in American law. Part V will 
revisit this understanding, but for now, it will serve for purposes of the 
following analysis. The next subsection considers the other two 
 
 107 See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prod. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251-52 
(2d Cir. 1977) (connecting agency’s procedural duties under Administrative 
Procedure Act’s rulemaking requirements to requirement that agency action be 
substantively rational). 
 108 See, e.g., id. (finding the agency to have employed a less than full rulemaking 
process and recognizing that that failure also impacted the substantive reasonableness 
of the final agency regulation). 
 109 Perhaps this latter relationship is most clear in the idea that “substantive” 
review under Step 2 of the Chevron test appears at times to be quite similar to the 
requirement of procedurally careful decision-making in “arbitrary and capricious” 
review of agency action. See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two 
Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1254 (1997) (proposing that Step 2 of 
Chevron and the “arbitrary and capricious” test be considered as identical tests). 
 110 Cf. Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 376, 376 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing majority for allegedly reviewing federal statute as if it were regulation 
promulgated by administrative agency). 
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relevant factors identified above – the nature of the legal rule that is 
the subject of the canon, and the identity of the government actor 
promulgating that rule. 
2. The Legal Rule and the Actor Promulgating It 
It is impossible to describe with any specificity the types of legal 
rules whose application might be influenced by a public trust canon. 
Such rules come in all shapes and sizes, from water rights statutes to 
organic statutes authorizing conservation agencies to manage natural 
resources, to municipal ordinances governing access to town beaches. 
Beyond the differences in subject matter, legal rules vary by type: from 
per se rules, to presumptions, to requirements that a subordinate 
official consider a set of factors, to vague requirements of fairness, 
equity, or the public interest.111 The enormous variation among the 
legal rules subject to a public trust interpretive canon means that this 
Article can describe them only through the examples that follow, with 
the caveat that such examples are only illustrative. These examples 
also illustrate how the identity of the decision-maker appropriately 
influences the analysis. 
First, consider a legislative decision to alienate a public trust 
resource or otherwise impact a public trust value. In that situation, the 
canon would likely take the form of a clear statement requirement112 
and a rule of narrow construction. These two interpretive rules are 
related, in that they both rest on the principle that legislatures must 
act consciously when they alienate a resource that warrants protection 
under the canon. This principle limits alienations to those that are 
intentional — those effects on public trust values that the statute in 
question inescapably requires. At the same time, the fact that courts 
would apply a canon, rather than a substantive rule of law, means that 
the legislature enjoys the ultimate authority to alienate public trust 
resources, without having to satisfy any more demanding judicial 
standard beyond drafting precision.113 
 
 111 E.g., 47 U.S.C § 307(a) (“The [Federal Communications] Commission, if public 
convenience, interest, or necessity will be served thereby . . . shall grant to any 
applicant therefor a station license provided for by this chapter.”). 
 112 In the words of one scholar, a “plain statement” or “clear statement” 
requirement is a requirement that, “(in its strongest) version rejects interpretation of a 
statute that overrides substantive values embodied in the rule, unless the statute 
explicitly so provides.” William Popkin, Law-Making Responsibility and Statutory 
Interpretation, 68 IND. L.J. 865, 880-81 (1993). 
 113 Compare, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 607 (Me.1981) (requiring 
“high and demanding standard of reasonableness” to legislation alienating public trust 
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As noted above,114 statutes can vary greatly in terms of the specificity 
of the rule they impose. A given statute’s level of specificity obviously 
matters when a court considers the canon’s impact. All other things 
being equal, a more specific statutory provision would be more 
resistant to construction in favor of public trust values than a more 
general one, because the former would more likely satisfy a clear 
statement requirement. Other characteristics would also matter if a 
court applies either a clear statement or narrow construction 
interpretive approach. For example, a mandatory provision would be 
more resistant to a public-trust-favorable reading than a permissive 
one, and one espousing a single clear policy value would be more 
resistant than one that seeks to accommodate a variety of values. 
Consider now an administrative agency’s alienation decision. 
Presumably an agency would reach such a decision either by using the 
discretion the statute granted it, or by carrying out a precise legislative 
directive. In the former case, the canon would operate primarily as a 
process-based requirement of administrative rationality, assuming that 
the legislature did in fact clearly grant this authority.115 The goal, as it 
usually is when courts review discretionary agency action, would be to 
ensure that the agency carefully considered the factors relevant to its 
decision. In this situation, courts could apply the canon by ensuring 
that the agency considered the public trust values at stake as one of 
the relevant decisional factors.116 If, by contrast, the agency acted in 
response to an explicit legislative mandate, administrative law 
principles117 suggest a shift in the inquiry. If the statute really 
 
resources), and Jackvony v. Powell, 21 A.2d 554 (R.I. 1941) (holding that traditional 
beach access rights protected under Rhode Island law and incorporated into 1843 
state constitution forbade city’s construction of fence limiting access to municipal 
beach). 
 114 See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 115 Compare Town of Warren v. Thornton-Whitehouse, 740 A.2d 1255 (R.I. 1999) 
(requiring explicit statutory language before concluding that legislature authorized 
municipalities to regulate construction on waterways), with Moot v. Dep’t of Envtl. 
Prot., 861 N.E.2d 410 (Mass. 2007) (holding that legislature did not give agency 
authority to relinquish state ownership interests in tidelands when it gave it authority 
to “preserve and protect” them). 
 116 In terms of the identity of the decision-maker, it bears noting that the 
procedural rationality review described here would likely be considered an illegitimate 
approach for judicial review of legislative action, given the separation of powers 
problems inherent in a court reviewing the legislature’s work product for adequate 
deliberation. 
 117 At the federal level, the most notable principle here is the so-called Chevron 
“two-step” for judicial review of agency statutory interpretations. See generally 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding 
that courts do not defer to agency interpretations when statute provides clear answer 
  
2012] The Public Trust Doctrine as an Interpretive Canon 723 
compelled the agency to alienate the resource, then the judicial 
inquiry would shift up the ladder, to judicial construction of the 
statute. 
Admittedly, these examples are couched at a high level of generality. 
However, even this brief, abstract examination of the different forms 
of legislative and administrative action illustrates the wide variety of 
criteria that would affect how a government action would be 
construed pursuant to the canon. Should the canon concept be 
accepted as a general matter, more work would be needed to flesh out 
its actual operation. 
IV. OBJECTIONS 
The above analysis may elicit objections from all sides: those who 
object to any expansion of the public trust doctrine beyond water-
based resources, those who favor an explicit expansion of a legally 
binding public trust doctrine beyond its current water-based focus, 
and those who simply question the legal analysis offered so far. These 
objections identify three general criteria that must be satisfied for the 
proposed canon to be acceptable. First, the proposed canon must be 
legitimate. Second, it must be workable. Third, its effects must be 
meaningful, yet appropriately limited. 
A. Legitimacy 
Perhaps the most obvious objection to the proposed public trust 
canon is that it is legally unprincipled. This objection maintains, 
reasonably enough, that a substantive interpretive canon118 must be 
justified by some underlying legal principle reflecting that substantive 
preference. It argues that a public trust value that extends beyond 
water-based resources lacks that foundation. Thus, even in its less 
binding form as a canon, it is illegitimate. This objection restates the 
argument against extension of a legally binding public trust doctrine 
to dry-land resources, and applies it to this Article’s proposal for a 
canon. It forces us to confront the question of whether a canon is 
justifiable, even if a legally binding rule of the same sort is not. 
It is not uncommon for a basic legal principle to lack a firm legal 
foundation.119 Basic structural components of our system, such as 
 
to interpretive question presented, but defer to any reasonable agency interpretation 
when statute is ambiguous as to answer). 
 118 See supra. note 51 (defining “substantive” canons). 
 119 See, e.g., sources cited infra note 121. 
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federalism, are sometimes expressed only by implication.120 Other 
basic principles have an even more obscure formal foundation. For 
example, the requirement that government act only in pursuance of a 
public purpose is thought to be fundamental to our conception of 
republican government, but is nowhere explicitly guaranteed in the 
Constitution.121 These high level examples illustrate that the lack of a 
firm textual foundation does not necessarily defeat an argument that a 
legal principle functions as a legally binding rule. 
Nevertheless, the legitimacy argument against a public trust canon 
maintains that such a canon lacks even the implicit foundations we 
can discern for principles such as federalism. In considering that 
objection, it is necessary to examine the two foundations cited for the 
public trust doctrine: precedent, most notably the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Illinois Central and state court decisions finding the public 
trust doctrine to apply as a matter of state law, and the policy 
arguments offered to justify expanding that doctrine beyond its 
traditional limits. The question is whether these sources provide an 
adequate legal foundation, not for a legally binding expanded public 
trust doctrine, but for a principle that would adequately support the 
proposed canon. 
So posed, the question seems to elicit a fairly clear answer in favor 
of the canon’s legitimacy. The public trust doctrine unquestionably 
exists as a legally binding rule and has existed for centuries.122 
Moreover, the traditional doctrine responds to concerns about the 
political vulnerability of diffusely held public resources that transfer, 
with more or less ease, to a wider set of resources and uses. As the 
“more or less” qualifier suggests, the transfer is not trouble-free. 
Bringing the doctrine onto dry land would represent a major 
expansion in its scope, as would embracing uses grounded in 
 
 120 See, e.g., LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 114 (1978) (“The 
Constitution presumes the existence of the states as lawmakers and governmental 
institutions distinct from the federal government.”); New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144, 187 (1992) (referring to federalism as follows: “Some truths are so basic 
that, like the air around us, they are easily overlooked.”); see also, e.g., Webster v. 
Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 606, 608 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing as a 
“fundamental constraint” on government action the requirement that such action be 
taken in pursuit of a public, rather than a private, purpose). 
 121 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 61 (2001) (“[T]he 
American constitutional tradition has long recognized a judicial authority, not 
necessarily linked to any specifically enumerated guarantee, to invalidate truly 
arbitrary legislation.”); see also Webster, 486 U.S. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting 
the fundamental nature of the rule against government action in pursuit of purely 
private interests). 
 122 See supra note 1. 
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conservation rather than access.123 As explained earlier, because these 
expansions would involve the judiciary in a wide-ranging set of policy 
issues, there is reason for concern about these moves. This is 
especially the case when legislatures and constitution drafters have 
begun to embrace these values in positive law. 
However, these conceded problems with an expansion of the 
judicially enforceable doctrine do not affect the relevant conclusion: a 
legally binding rule protecting public resources exists and finds 
support in modern understandings of politics in a liberal democracy. 
The rule itself may lack a clear legal foundation.124 The modern rule 
may also bear only partial resemblance to its earlier focus on 
commerce promotion.125 Nevertheless, the modern resource-protecting 
version of the rule is well established in American law. The argument 
for a canon relies simply on the existence of a supporting legal rule, 
not on whether that rule itself is unambiguously grounded and has 
remained in its original form for centuries. 
Thus, the existence of that rule opens the possibility for a wider, but 
penumbral, principle that takes the form of an interpretive canon. It 
does not prove the argument; the bare fact that a legal principle exists 
does not by itself make the case for a broader penumbral interpretive 
canon. But it does furnish a foundation for such a canon should the 
rest of the argument be made. 
B. Workability 
Another objection to this proposal argues that a canon protecting 
public trust values is unworkable. At its base, this argument is 
grounded on Karl Llewellyn’s and others’ critiques of canons as 
radically indeterminate,126 although the argument here points in a 
slightly different direction. As applied to a public trust canon, the 
 
 123 See, e.g., Niki Pace, Wetlands or Seawalls? Adopting Shoreland Regulation to 
Address Sea Level Rise and Wetland Regulation in the Gulf of Mexico, 26 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 327, 344 (2011) (noting how “some states have expanded the public trust 
doctrine to encompass recreation”); Margaret Poloso & Margaret Caldwell, Dynamic 
Property Rights: The Public Trust Doctrine and Takings in a Changing Climate, 30 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 51, 52 (2011) (“[p]rovid[ing]. . . a theoretical explanation of how common 
law doctrines can expand the regulatory authority of the public trust onto dry land.”).  
 124 See supra Part I. 
 125 But see, e.g., Morse v. Or. Div. of State Lands, 590 P.2d 709 (Or. 1979) (relying 
on commerce-promotion goals of public trust doctrine); Rose, supra. note 1 at 776 
(arguing for the continued vitality of the commerce-promotion justification for the 
public trust doctrine). 
 126 See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text. 
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basic thesis is that such a canon, however applied,127 amounts to a call 
to judges to place a thumb on the scales in favor of public trust assets. 
The criticism here centers on the idea that the very notion of a “thumb 
on the scales” is incapable of providing a determinate standard by 
which judges could decide whether the public trust asset has been 
accorded sufficient protection.128 
1. Workability as Analytical Coherence 
To the extent this objection amounts to a general indictment of 
standards of review, it proves too much. Courts go to great lengths to 
delineate standards of review, both of legislative and administrative 
action and the decisions of lower courts. It is true enough that at times 
these standards appear to determine less than one might think. For 
example, studies demonstrate that the (in)famous distinction between 
Chevron and Skidmore deference to federal administrative agency 
statutory interpretations does not translate into radically different 
affirmance rates for those interpretations.129 On the other hand, while 
it is easy to criticize the Supreme Court’s inconsistent applications of 
review standards in constitutional cases, lurking behind those 
exceptions is the mine run of constitutional cases where, for example, 
rational basis review really is exceptionally deferential, and strict 
scrutiny really is searching.130 One can find similar real world effects of 
 
 127 See supra Part III.C. (discussing possibility of both substantive and procedural 
applications of such canon). 
 128 Cf. Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. 
L. REV. 1669, 1785 (1975) (casting doubt on judicial practice of narrowly construing 
agency-authorization statutes to ensure consideration of under-represented interests, 
based on concern that such practice “tends to multiply the issues for decision in a way 
that diminishes the odds of finding a clear statutory directive to resolve the 
controversy”). 
 129 See, e.g., Richard Pierce, What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Action 
Mean? 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77 (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1604701 (finding difference in affirmation rate of less than 
3%). On the other hand, a recent study does suggest that, at least the Supreme Court 
level, the difference between these standards and the Seminole Rock/Auer standard for 
reviewing agency interpretations of their own regulations does translate into 
significantly different affirmance rates. See generally id. (analyzing court cases 
applying these two standards and reaching this conclusion). 
 130 See, e.g., Edward Lyons, Reason’s Freedom and the Dialectic of Ordered Liberty, 55 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 157, 160 (2007) (“In default cases involving regulation of “garden 
variety” social or economic activity, a deferential “rational basis” standard is 
applied.”); Kathleen Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 
60 (1992) (arguing that strict scrutiny and rational basis standards were designed to 
prevent courts from falling into temptation to engage in ad-hoc balancing). 
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standards of review in the area of appellate court review of lower court 
fact-findings and legal conclusions.131 Simply put, standards matter. 
But this objection goes deeper, questioning whether the very nature 
of a canon requiring consideration of public trust values can ever be 
expressed so precisely as to provide a workable standard. So 
understood, the objection here is not so much an allegation that 
“standards don’t matter,” but rather, that a standard in this area is 
incapable of providing courts with a precise and workable guide. 
Thus, the objection goes, it may be one thing to require an appellate 
court to consider whether an agency’s statutory interpretation decision 
is “reasonable,”132 to review a lower court’s fact-findings for “clear 
error,”133 or to review a statute to determine whether it was narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling government interest,134 but quite 
another thing to direct a court simply to consider public trust values 
whenever a decision implicates those values. 
This is a fair objection. However, it bears repeating that the 
proposed canon is not as terse or simplistic as the prior paragraph 
suggests. Rather, the characteristics of the underlying public trust 
principle — the nature of public trust assets in our political and legal 
system, and their role in society — help shape how courts should 
implement this canon. Recall those characteristics: the inherently 
public nature of these goods, both in terms of the uses that are made 
of them and, in light of those uses, the net losses that flow from 
recognizing private ownership rights; and the implications of such 
publicness for their protection in our liberal, pluralistic political 
system. These characteristics help shape the scope and intensity of the 
consideration courts should give to protecting public trust resources 
via an interpretive canon. 
Further, as explained earlier,135 an important input into the 
interpretive task would be a judge’s understanding of the particular 
requirements of the construed legal source. Because the protection for 
 
 131 See, e.g., Joshua Fischman & Max Schanzenbach, Do Standards of Review 
Matter? The Case of Federal Criminal Sentencing, Va. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, 
Working Paper No. 2010-23, (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1434123 (suggesting that standards of review in federal 
criminal sentencing context do exercise some constraining effect on judges).  
 132 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 845 
(1984) (requiring that courts review agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory 
provisions for reasonableness). 
 133 See FED. R. CIV. P. 52. 
 134 See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Comp. Bd., 502 
U.S. 105 (1991) (applying this standard). 
 135 See supra. Part III(C)(2). 
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public trust values this Article proposes takes the form of influence on 
a court’s construction of a separate and distinct legal requirement 
(such as a statute), the application of the proposed canon would 
necessarily vary with the characteristics of that legal rule. 
Thus, implementing the canon amounts to far more than a judge 
placing an inchoate, generalized “thumb on the scale.” Rather, when 
properly understood, it responds to the particular position of public 
trust assets in the given case, considering the identity of the relevant 
parties (e.g., a legislature as opposed to an agency) and the nature of 
the legal provision being construed. This understanding of the canon 
refutes criticism that the proposal is analytically incoherent. It may be 
difficult to apply — a matter taken up by the next section — but not 
conceptually incoherent. 
2. Workability as Judicial Competence 
One might concede the theoretical coherence of the approach 
sketched out above, but still object to the canon on the ground that it 
imposes insurmountable practical difficulties on courts. This objection 
centers on concerns about judicial competence. It reflects the fact that 
the canon would require courts to determine how to apply a relatively 
vague presumption in favor of public trust uses, and then factor that 
presumption in to what is often an already complex set of legal 
standards governing the challenged action. Unquestionably, the 
combination of these steps adds to the complexity of cases involving 
the proposed canon. Inevitably, adding another factor to a court’s 
consideration of any legal issue increases the issue’s complexity. But 
this additional difficulty is not so different in type or degree as to 
justify rejecting this canon on judicial competence grounds. 
First, as explained earlier,136 applications of substantive 
presumptions and standards of review are part and parcel of courts’ 
work. Judicial experience with this task includes both steps outlined 
here: determining what a particular presumption or review standard 
requires in a given case and then applying it.137 On its face, nothing 
about the public trust canon makes its application different, either in 
 
 136 See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 137 Compare United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (determining, as 
matter preliminary to applying applicable standard of review to agency’s statutory 
interpretation decision, what that standard should be), with United States v. 
McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (determining appropriate 
standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact, which in turn requires 
distinguishing between law and fact, before applying that resulting standard). 
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type or degree, from other glosses that courts must apply when 
interpreting legal texts. 
Second, particular applications of the canon are quite analogous to 
other requirements that are widely present in American law. For 
example, the requirement that agencies evaluating policy options 
consider all the relevant factors exists in most, if not all, administrative 
law systems.138 Applying the canon to situations where an agency 
makes a discretionary decision that impacts public trust resources 
would entail the same type of review, adding public trust values to the 
factors the agency must consider. Similarly, substantive canons 
abound in American law.139 Whether called clear statement rules, 
presumptions, or interpretive canons, these guides are familiar to 
American judges. 
Third, nothing in the rationales underlying the public trust canon 
makes the canon particularly resistant to competent judicial 
application. For example, when a statute requires an administrative 
agency to consider diffuse interests, such as public health, reviewing 
courts will necessarily examine the resulting administrative rule to 
confirm that the agency considered that interest.140 Nothing about the 
diffuseness of public trust values makes it more difficult for a court to 
apply this canon’s procedural version. Nor is there anything unique 
about a substantive presumption in favor of public trust assets that 
renders that version of the canon any more difficult to apply than the 
myriad of clear statement rules, presumptions, and canons that exist 
elsewhere in American law. Courts may sometimes find it difficult to 
determine whether a statute has satisfied such a rule.141 But there is no 
reason to think that a substantive presumption in favor of public trust 
resources is any harder for courts to manage than presumptions 
 
 138 In the federal system, this requirement has been explicated in a series of 
foundational Supreme Court cases. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations v., 129 S.Ct. 
1800, 1810-1812 (2009); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
463 U.S. 29, 55 (1983); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 
416 (1971). 
 139 See, e.g., United States v. United Cont’l Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 168 (1976) 
(describing canon that disfavors reading statute as impliedly repealing an earlier 
statute). 
 140 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (holding that it 
does not violate non-delegation doctrine for Congress to require the EPA to 
promulgate air quality standards “requisite to protect the public health” and then 
reviewing whether agency’s implementation of that mandate was reasonable). 
 141 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (reflecting 
disagreement between Justices as to whether CERCLA statute clearly abrogated state 
sovereign immunity). 
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against federal intrusions into the federal-state balance142 or 
authorizations to agencies to act retroactively,143 or narrow 
constructions of statutes in derogation of the common law.144 It may 
be true that cases involving public trust assets would arise more 
frequently than cases implicating other types of presumptions – 
though this is by no means self-evident. But even if that were true, 
there is no reason to think that this additional volume of cases 
translates into a more difficult inquiry for courts on a case-by-case 
basis, or even that it in the aggregate it adds to courts’ burdens so 
much as to justify rejecting such a presumption as beyond judicial 
capacity. 
C. Meaningfulness 
The foregoing objections flow from concerns about the canon’s 
legitimacy and practical workability. Another set of objections turn on 
the canon’s real world effects. An objection coming from public trust 
protection sympathizers argues that the canon is largely superfluous. 
This objection argues that legal protections for environmental 
interests, most notably state constitutional provisions and so-called 
“little NEPAs,”145 provide both the substantive and procedural 
protection that this canon would deliver. At the other end of the 
spectrum, one might object that the canon effectively expands to dry-
land resources the full-blown version of the public trust doctrine. 
1. The Comparative Scopes of the Canon and Positive Law 
The first response to the objection about superfluity is that a public 
trust canon may cover situations that are not covered by little NEPAs 
 
 142 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 453 (1991) (construing Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act not to apply to state court judges given federalism 
implications of such interpretation). 
 143 See Bowen Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (noting 
presumption that Congress does not give agencies authority to promulgate regulations 
with retroactive effect). 
 144 See, e.g., NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND’S STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 61.01 (7th ed. 2011) (“[S]tatutes in derogation of the common law 
should be strictly construed . . . .”). 
 145 “Little NEPAs” are the state-law versions of the federal National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006) [hereinafter NEPA]. In a nutshell, NEPA 
requires the federal government to consider the environmental impacts of any major 
federal action significantly affecting the environment. Little NEPAs are state laws that 
impose analogous requirements on state governments. For a discussion of NEPA, see 
STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 81,143 (5th ed. 2010).  
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or other positive law. Little NEPAs do not exist in all states146 and vary 
greatly in their coverage, their requirements, and their provisions for 
judicial review.147 Moreover, their general requirement that 
government consider environmental impacts does not completely 
track the impact a canon would have. For example, little NEPAs 
generally do not apply to state legislatures.148 By contrast, this Article 
envisions that the proposed canon would apply to legislation. 
Still, the objection may have force in a state that has enacted in its 
positive law significant substantive and procedural protections for the 
environment.149 But this fact should count in favor, not against, the 
canon proposal. The basic idea behind the canon is that it responds to 
a fundamental background principle of American law that may be 
difficult to instantiate because of concerns about judicial authority and 
competence. To the extent that the legislature of a state (or its people, 
in the case of a constitutional amendment) translates that broad 
principle into a precise legal rule enforceable by a court, one can 
conclude that canon has served its purpose. At that point, the canon 
can appropriately fade from the scene, at least to the extent the 
positive law protection covers the situation at hand. This dynamic is 
somewhat analogous to the familiar principle that statutory law 
supersedes the common law. When a positive law enactment provides 
the protection that the canon would otherwise provide, it is 
appropriate to conclude that the purpose of the canon — to ensure 
that public trust values are recognized — has been satisfied. 
 
 146 See David Sive & Mark Chertok, Little NEPAs and Their Environmental Impact 
Assessment Procedures, SK008 ALI-ABA 325, 327-28 (2004) (describing 2004 survey 
counting 15 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico as jurisdictions that have 
enacted a little NEPA); see also Daniel Selmi, Themes in the Evolution of the State 
Environmental Policy Acts, 38 URB. LAW. 949, 951 (2006) (describing 2006 survey two 
years later counting 16 states, along with District of Columbia and Puerto Rico).  
 147 See Sive & Chertok, supra note 146 (noting the coverage and judicial review 
provisions of little NEPAs); Selmi, supra note 146, at 954-57 (noting the coverage 
provisions of little NEPAs). 
 148 See Selmi, supra note 146, at 956. 
 149 See, e.g., Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236, 1246 
(Mont. 1999) (concluding Montana Constitution requires actions infringing on 
citizens’ enjoyment of a clean environment satisfy version of strict scrutiny); Selmi, 
supra note 146, at 982 (illustrating that California’s little NEPA, the California 
Environmental Quality Act, “establishes a policy that agencies should not approve 
projects where feasible alternatives or mitigation measures would reduce 
environmental damage”). 
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2. Has American Law Obviated the Public Trust Doctrine? 
The prospect, noted in the prior section, of positive law superseding 
the proposed public trust canon raises the empirical question of 
whether this dynamic has occurred to such a degree that the canon is, 
in fact, already obsolete. Writing in the mid-1980s, Richard Lazarus 
suggested that the public trust doctrine may have outlived its 
usefulness, in part because of developments in public law that 
increased government power to protect public trust values in privately 
held land and recognized government’s duty to protect such values in 
its decision-making more generally.150 However, developments since 
Professor Lazarus’s article call into question the vitality of at least 
some of the phenomena he believed to have obsolesced the doctrine. 
First, takings law has moved, at least somewhat, toward increased 
protection for private property. Heightened requirements for 
conditional development permits,151 per se rules finding a regulation to 
constitute a taking,152 acceptance of the idea that landowners can have 
a takings claim even when they take title to property after the state has 
reduced the relevant bundle of sticks associated with property 
ownership,153 and the possibility that the Court may recognize a taking 
based on a state court’s interpretation of state property law154 all 
suggest at least somewhat greater protection for private property 
owners against government regulation imposed for environmental 
reasons.155 Together these developments156 call into question the 
 
 150 Lazarus, Changing Conceptions, supra note 3, at 658-91 (1986). 
 151 See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (requiring some 
relationship between development permit conditions and problem caused by 
development). 
 152 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-19 (1992) 
(describing regulatory takings of landlords’ property rights). 
 153 Compare Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626-28 (2001) (holding that 
a landowner can have a valid takings claim even when the law reducing his property 
rights was enacted before he purchased the parcel in question), with Richard J. 
Lazarus, The Measure of a Justice: Justice Scalia and the Faltering of the Property Rights 
Movement within the Supreme Court, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 759, 815-17 (2006) [hereinafter 
Lazarus, Measure of a Justice] (arguing Palazzolo is not as strongly pro-property rights 
as might appear). 
 154 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. 
Ct. 2592, 2612 (2010) (plurality opinion) (recognizing possibility of a judicial 
taking); id. at 2614 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (declining to decide this issue but 
expressing doubt about concept of judicial taking); id. at 2618 (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(declining to decide this issue). 
 155 Moreover, the hotly contested 5−4 decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 
U.S. 469 (2005), and, perhaps even more directly, states’ responses to Kelo, at least 
raise the possibility that claims of public use will be more carefully scrutinized when 
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modern force of Lazarus’s argument that the expansion of the police 
power has rendered less relevant the property rights−reservation 
theory underlying the classic public trust doctrine. 
Second, the administrative law developments Lazarus identified, 
which he argued mitigated the need for the public trust doctrine to 
ensure adequate government consideration of public trust values, have 
also moved in a direction unfavorable to those values. Federal courts’ 
increased reluctance to review programmatic agency action at the behest 
of environmental plaintiffs157 makes it harder to obtain judicial review of 
the broader environmental decisions that are most important for many 
public trust values today. At the same time, the arguable decline in the 
intensity of “hard look” review of agency action158 suggests that when 
courts engage in such review, it may not be as searching as Professor 
Lazarus was able to assume a quarter-century ago. 
Third, the rise of cost-benefit analysis — a phenomenon Professor 
Lazarus identified159 — raises new risks to the consideration of public 
trust values. As scholars have long noted, elevation of cost-benefit 
analysis as a major factor in administrative decision-making raises 
difficult issues about the valuation of interests that are not easily 
quantifiable, let alone monetizable.160 While scholars offer various 
 
private property rights are at stake. Concededly, Kelo is technically not on point, given 
that it focused on the question of government power to acquire property by eminent 
domain when the public use was alleged to be a private use in disguise. Presumably, 
such actions in pursuit of public trust values easily come within the public use rubric. 
Still, the controversy surrounding Kelo is consistent with a greater solicitude for 
private property rights that may affect government power to impact property rights in 
pursuit of public trust values. 
 156 The Court’s — and states’ — directions with regard to the takings clause is not 
completely clear. See Lazarus, Measure of a Justice, supra note 153, at 811-23 
(suggesting that the Court has flagged in its protection of private property rights). At 
the very least, though, the developments identified in the text, which occurred after 
Professor Lazarus wrote, suggest at least greater protection for those rights at the 
expense of broad government power to act to protect public trust values. 
 157 See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 72 (2004) (finding 
ongoing agency obligations unreviewable under the APA); Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife 
Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885-900 (1990) (finding programmatic agency action 
unreviewable under the APA). 
 158 Compare Motor Vehicle Mfrs Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29 (1983) (using arguably strict review to strike down the agency’s consideration of a 
regulatory issue under “arbitrary and capricious review”), with FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, 556 U.S. 502 (2009) (arguably reviewing the agency’s action under more 
deferential standards). 
 159 See Lazarus, Changing Conceptions, supra note 3, at 682 n.317. 
 160 See, e.g., NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
144 (2005) (characterizing, quantifying, and monetizing “full range” of climate 
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methods to account for these difficulties within the context of a 
general cost-benefit mandate,161 the general focus on cost-benefit 
analysis raises the possibility that the administrative process will be 
systematically skewed against interests, such as public trust interests, 
that are not easily reducible to inputs in cost-benefit calculations. 
These public law developments described above generally refer to 
federal rather than state law. Still, to the extent they reflect general 
trends in public law,162 they suggest that the developments Professor 
Lazarus identified as obviating the need for the public trust doctrine 
may have either slowed down or even partially reversed, thus making 
some version of a public trust principle relevant once again. 
3. Does the Canon Amount to a Backdoor Expansion of a Legally 
Binding Public Trust Doctrine? 
The opposite objection to the proposed canon is that it is too 
aggressive, in that it all but envisions expansion of a legally binding 
public trust doctrine. This objection describes the public trust 
doctrine as a requirement that government give heightened 
consideration to public trust values. Thus, some argue that the classic 
public trust itself takes the form of a presumption, or as expressed in 
this Article, a canon of construction. If so, then this Article’s call for 
such a canon is essentially indistinguishable from a call for expanding 
the doctrine itself. This argument is a fair one; on reflection, however, 
it loses much of its force. 
First, the premise of the argument — that the public trust doctrine 
functions not as a substantive restriction on government authority but 
rather as a de facto “hard look” requirement or presumption — is not 
completely accurate. Courts often use the doctrine as a substantive 
 
change effects as “conceptually, ethically and empirically very difficult”); Jonathan 
Cannon, The Sounds of Silence: Cost-Benefit Canons in Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, 
Inc., 34 HARV. ENVT’L L.REV. 425, 430 (2010) (noting difficulty in quantifying 
environmental benefits). 
 161 E.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 139, 369-70 (1997) 
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS] (advocating modified form of cost-benefit 
analysis that would allow departures from purely economic criteria). 
 162 See, e.g., Christina Ditty, The Frustration of the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act: Clean Air For Everyone v. Meyer, 20 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 141, 
148 (2006) (noting cost-benefit requirement in Washington environmental law); 
Samuel Hays, The Future of Environmental Regulation, 15 J. L. & COM. 549, 557-59 
(1996) (noting attempts by Illinois and air quality agency for southern California to 
perform cost-benefit analysis). 
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limit on government authority to alienate public trust property or 
impair public trust values.163 
Second, the fact that the proposed canon influences outcomes by 
filtering pro−public trust preferences through other legal requirements 
means that treating the doctrine as a canon will not yield the same 
results as a free-standing public trust doctrine. As explained earlier,164 
if the underlying legal requirement is that the decision-maker consider 
particular factors in making its decision, then this canon would likely 
require the agency to consider public trust values. By contrast, if the 
underlying law is substantive — for example, if it permitted alienation 
of public trust property or destruction of public trust values — then 
that authority would be construed more narrowly. Thus, sensitively 
applied, the canon would impact actual decisions in ways potentially 
far different from those that might obtain under a legally binding 
public trust rule. 
V. UNDERSTANDING THE CANON AND ITS UNDERLYING DOCTRINE 
The final, and in some ways most fundamental, objection to this 
Article’s proposed canon is that it does not respond to the concerns 
that motivated it. This argument levels essentially the same objection 
to the proposed canon that some scholars and judges level at the 
Supreme Court’s embrace of intermediate scrutiny in the equal 
protection context: that it represents nothing but a poorly thought-out 
compromise between two extreme positions, rather than the result of a 
principled legal analysis. As such, the criticism goes, the idea of a 
canon simply reflects an unprincipled compromise between the 
extreme positions of no dry-land public trust-based protection at all 
and, on the other side, a binding legal rule protecting dry-land public 
 
 163 See, e.g., Lake Mich. Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 742 F. Supp. 441, 444 
(N.D. Ill. 1990) (“[A]ny attempt by the state to relinquish its power over a public 
resource should be invalidated under the [public trust] doctrine.”); Zack’s, Inc. v. City 
of Sausalito, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 797 (Ct. App. 2008) (limiting, under the public trust 
doctrine, the state’s power to alienate tidelands and submerged lands); State by 
Kobayashi v. Zimring, 566 P.2d 725, 735 (Haw. 1977) (employing “public trust 
principles” to limit the state’s ability to sell land held for the public); see also People v. 
Cal. Fish Co., 138 P. 79, 82 (Cal. 1913) (quoting Ward v. Mulford, 32 Cal. 365, 372 
(1867)) (“The right of the state is subservient to the public rights of navigation and 
fishery, and theoretically, at least, the state can make no disposition of them 
prejudicial to the right of the public to use them for the purposes of navigation and 
fishery, and, whatever disposition she does make of them, her grantee takes them 
upon the same terms upon which she holds them, and of course, subject to the public 
rights above mentioned.”). 
 164 See supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text. 
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trust resources to the same degree as their aquatic counterparts. This 
objection requires that we think more carefully about the public trust 
doctrine, so we can determine whether the proposed canon constitutes 
an analytically plausible tool for courts. This argument requires a 
return to our earlier consideration of the proper grounding for the 
public trust doctrine in American law.165 
The first step in responding to this objection recognizes that a 
public trust canon is not an innovation in American law. Instead, it 
grows out of the undoubted existence of the core public trust doctrine 
as expressed in cases such as Illinois Central. In this sense, the canon 
could be understood as a penumbra emanating from the core 
component of the doctrine. Of course, penumbras can be criticized as 
unprincipled. Justice Black’s criticism of the most famous penumbra in 
American law — the “right of privacy” Justice Douglas discerned in 
Griswold v. Connecticut166 — centered on this argument.167 The 
challenge is to discern a principled reason to view the core, water-
based public doctrine as a foundation for this broader penumbra. 
One can meet this challenge by understanding the development of 
the core doctrine not as an arbitrary rule that singles out water-based 
resources for special protection, but as an exemplification of a broader 
American commitment to non-arbitrary government. On this 
understanding, legal rules must always be based on some notion of the 
public good.168 This understanding allows for vindication of private 
interests, but these interests must be the equal and fair beneficiaries of 
a general rule enacted to benefit all. This type of requirement has 
permeated statements of fundamental American law, from “law of the 
land” clauses in early state constitutions to prohibitions on “class 
legislation” during the middle decades of the nineteenth century, to 
the Equal Protection Clause.169 
Of course, stated at this high level of generality, this rule is difficult 
for courts to apply.170 When confronted with fundamental but vague 
 
 165 See supra Part III.A. 
 166 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
 167 See id. at 507, 508-10 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 168 See generally Sunstein, Nondelegation, supra note 58 (identifying concern for the 
public good as a fundamental requirement of legislative action under the U.S. 
Constitution). 
 169 See generally V.F. Nourse, The Lost History of Governance and Equal Protection, 
58 DUKE L.J. 955 (2009) (noting this history). 
 170 See, e.g., Richard Kay, The Equal Protection Clause in the Supreme Court, 1873–
1903, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 667, 705 (1980) (noting how the Supreme Court’s investigation 
into the reasonableness of legislative classifications in the late nineteenth century 
inevitably led it to an ultimately-abandoned practice of evaluating the wisdom of the 
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rules, courts often craft more specific legal rules to guide on-the-
ground adjudication of concrete cases. For example, in an attempt to 
apply equal protection’s vague command of “treating likes alike,” 
courts have crafted an elaborate structure of mediating rules that 
require particular scrutiny levels for specific classifications. 
Analogously, courts unsure of their competence to police the 
substance of the federal-state balance sometimes rely on the political 
process, not by completely deferring to congressional legislation, but 
rather by requiring Congress to speak plainly when it legislates in 
ways that impact that balance.171 
The canon proposed here should be understood as a similar 
instantiation of the basic imperative that government act in pursuance 
of the public interest. It responds to the reality that public trust uses of 
natural resources are often under-represented in the political-
administrative process exactly because of their diffuse nature. At the 
same time, as Carol Rose explained, the public may gain significant 
benefits from public ownership — benefits that outweigh the 
aggregate benefits of private parties’ ownership of the resource. Thus, 
government decision-making relating to public trust resources runs 
the risk of underprotecting those public values. As such, public trust 
values deserve protection from courts. 
However, as critics note, it is also true that the doctrine’s expansion 
into dry-land resources raises analytical and practical problems. 
Precedent, which until recently focused on aquatic resources, does not 
directly support this expansion. It also presents the potential for 
exceptionally broad applications of the doctrine’s legal rule restricting 
government alienation.172 In addition to raising legitimacy concerns, 
such an expansion may also test the competence of courts as they are 
asked to decide complex land use and ecosystem-management 
questions, and evaluate the real costs and benefits associated with 
 
challenged legislation).  
 171 See, e.g., Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 114, 116 (1992) 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that presumption that Congress does not intend to 
preempt state law “provides assurance that the federal-state balance will not be 
disturbed unintentionally by Congress or unnecessarily by the courts”) (internal 
quotation and citation omitted); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (same); 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (noting that Congress must speak 
plainly when enacting legislation that impacts the federal-state balance), overruled on 
other grounds by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).  
 172 For example, one commentator has proposed applying the doctrine to a claim 
on behalf of the public that a professional sports team repay government expenditures 
on a sports stadium. See Chris Dumbroski, Application of the Public Trust Doctrine to 
the Pittsburgh Stadium and Exhibition Authority, 7 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 63, 65 (2010). 
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conflicting resource uses. But it is exactly these problems flowing from 
a broader doctrine that lead to under-enforcement of the basic 
principle. 
An interpretive canon is a mediating rule that provides courts with a 
judicially manageable method of vindicating the fundamental 
principle of public purpose in government management of natural 
resources. When aquatic resources played the most important role in 
vindicating public trust values, courts embraced the doctrine to 
protect those values. As social needs have changed, many scholars 
have called for the law to change as well, and to recognize and protect 
those values in a broader set of resources. But objectors have a fair 
point that, taken to its logical extreme, such an expansion would be 
hard to cabin. In such a situation, where the logic of a legal rule takes 
courts beyond their likely competence (or legitimacy), an interpretive 
canon becomes more than an unprincipled midway point between a 
legally binding rule and no rule at all. Instead, it becomes an 
appropriate method of vindicating the underlying principle in a way 
that is both accessible to courts and consistent with their legitimacy as 
an important player, but not the sole player, in our government 
system.173 
CONCLUSION 
This Article attempts to resolve what it describes as the “paradox” of 
the public trust doctrine: a deeply felt principle established in 
venerable law, but at the same time, an incompletely worked-out legal 
doctrine that, in its more aggressive forms, threatens to provide courts 
with wide-ranging authority poorly cabined by legal rules. It proposes 
a canon approach to an expanded application of the doctrine. 
Regardless of whether this proposal gains acceptance, it remains 
clear that the public trust doctrine requires further study. Scholars 
 
 173 In addition, under this approach it makes sense that the proposed canon would 
have little impact in situations where a court already applies a legal requirement 
protecting public assets — such as when a state constitutional provision or little 
NEPA applies. In such situations it could be said that the resource-protecting law has 
directly addressed the resource underrepresentation problem and, thus, obviated the 
need for a mediating rule such as an interpretive canon. This makes much more sense 
than attempting to find room for an expanded public trust doctrine fitting alongside a 
state constitutional provision or little NEPA that applies to the particular case before 
the court. Attempting to shoehorn in a public trust doctrine in such a situation raises 
serious legitimacy questions, not simply because of the lack of a solid foundation for a 
dry-land public trust doctrine, but also because the existence of the constitutional or 
statutory protection for the asset would seem to suggest that the legislature had in fact 
supplanted any common law dry-land doctrine. 
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continue to call for an expansion of the doctrine to respond to the 
heightened need for more careful attention before natural resources 
are alienated or shifted into private uses. In a world of disappearing 
ecosystems and changing climates, our increased understanding of the 
benefits those resources provide as publicly owned resources 
dedicated to public uses make those calls ever more pressing. 
Accommodating those needs within our legal system and traditions is 
an urgent task, to which scholars of public law, environmental law, 
and property law must turn if the law is to retain its promise of 
flexibility and adaptability to new social needs. 
